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Introduction
Merchants, however amiable they are in uniting the Bonds of universal Society, 
notwithstanding the Separation of Countries, Climates, Manners, Religions and 
Governments, however useful they are in softening the natural Wants and Miseries 
of Mankind, or in controuling the fatal consequences that flow from the Ambition of 
Princes, and in extending over the World the Connections of Humanity, yet as they form 
a kind of separate Republic of themselves, independent of the several Governments 
under which they live, their Connections in one Relation often jar with their Duties in 
another, since they make a Link of that Chain in which the Enemies of their Country are 
not the less united.1
So wrote English lawyer James Marriott at the height of the Seven Years’ War in an 
open letter to the Dutch merchants then living in England. Though the Dutch were 
neutrals in the war, he argued, their trading activities united them in an enterprise 
that transcended the state and at times conflicted with its interests: international 
commerce. To Marriott, the very commercial activities that drew societies together by 
promoting peace and prosperity also created “a separate Republic” of commerce 
whose interests frequently collided with those of nation-states. The global commercial 
warfare of the Seven Years’ War, unprecedented as it was in scale, demanded that 
the traditional position of the neutral trader be reconceived and adapted to the 
modern commercial economy, an economy governed by market forces that were 
in many ways beyond political control, and to an international system in which 
the economies of different states were increasingly integrated through trade. The 
Seven Years’ War posed the question: was it possible for a merchant to be truly 
neutral when the fruits of his labours could help or harm the belligerents?
1 James Marriott, A Letter to the Dutch Merchants in England (London: M. Cooper, 1759), pp. 15–16.
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This paper recounts the revolution in the law of neutrality that occurred during 
the Seven Years’ War, placing it in the context of contemporary debates on 
commerce and neutral rights theory. The Seven Years’ War saw the emergence 
of what were to become two seminal maritime doctrines. One was the Rule of the 
War of 1756 and the other the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage. These doctrines 
effectively limited the commercial rights of neutrals to those available in time of 
peace, thus qualifying the traditional rule of privileged neutrality that free ships 
make free goods. They mark the beginning of the modern era in neutral rights and 
have remained in effect down to the present. The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage 
made the legitimacy of neutral trade dependent not just on its content but also on 
the purpose and intent of the shipper. A sea voyage to or from enemy territory that 
included several intermediate stops in neutral ports would be considered a single, 
continuous voyage encompassing all its ports of call.2 The combined effect of these 
doctrines was that neutral ships could no longer engage in trade with belligerent 
ports that had been closed to them in peacetime.
The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage and the Rule of the War of 1756 thus 
marked a revolution in both the substantive content of the law of neutrality and the 
philosophical trajectory of neutral rights jurisprudence, codifying into law the proto-
positivist theories of Cornelius van Bynkershoek at the expense of Grotian just-
war theory. They emerged at a time when international trade had become both an 
object and weapon of war, in an era when trade had become what David Hume 
felicitously described as “an affair of state.”3 As the modern commercial economy 
emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so too did political economy 
in the truest sense of the phrase. The modern commercial state was one in which 
political and commercial life were closely connected. Indeed it was one in which 
the vigour and security of the state itself depended on the vigour and security of 
its commerce. Contemporary political philosophers were acutely aware of this,4 
and while they grappled with the implications of this economic transformation in 
the realm of political philosophy, jurists, advocates and diplomats grappled with 
its implications for the rights of neutral traders in the arena of international affairs.
Julian Corbett, the great historian of the Seven Years’ War, observed, “in the 
study of the functions of a fleet a chart is useless. It cuts off our vision just where 
the most obscure and difficult part of the study begins. For it is behind the coast-
line that are at work the dominant factors by which the functions of a fleet are 
2 Herbert Whittaker Briggs writes that the “doctrine of continuous voyage has been defined as 
an application of the general rule of law dolus non purgatur circuitu – that a person is not permitted 
to do by indirection what he is forbidden to do directly.” Herbert Whittaker Briggs, The Doctrine 
of Continuous Voyage (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926), p. 11. Hence in time of war, stops 
a ship makes in neutral ports before visiting an enemy port may be deemed intermediate stops 
rather than independent voyages. They become stops made en route to an enemy port in a single 
continuous voyage. James W. Gantenbein, The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage Particularly as 
Applied to Contraband and Blockade (Portland OR: Keystone Press, 1929), pp. 1–4.
3 For discussion, see Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-
State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 8–22, 185–94. 
4 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp. 8–22, 185–94.
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determined.”5 The reverse could be said of the rules of neutral trade that emerged 
during the Seven Years’ War. To understand their origins, one must look beyond 
the prize courts and the pronouncements of Doctors’ Commons to the activities of 
the fleets themselves. In addition to political pamphlets and judicial decisions of 
the period, heavy reliance has been placed on the records of the British Admiralty, 
all of which reflect the processes of decision (and indecision) that produced the 
neutral rights revolution of the Seven Years’ War. Particular attention is paid to the 
manner and context in which statesmen, jurists, and pamphleteers invoked the 
Law of Nations to bring about a fundamental change in international law that went 
well beyond refurbishing existing doctrines of neutrality. In abandoning historic 
conceptions of neutrality in favour of ideas promoted in the writings of Cornelius 
van Bynkershoek, Great Britain in effect abandoned the natural law conception 
of neutral rights completely. What followed, no pun intended, amounted to a sea 
change in the maritime relations of commercial states under international law.
This chapter first discusses the legal imperatives raised by the commercial 
warfare of the Seven Years’ War, with particular attention to the manner in which 
the independence of British prize courts came to be seen as essential to both free 
government and commercial prosperity. The paper then focuses on the contest 
between the Netherlands and Great Britain over neutral trading rights. This phase 
of the conflict had far-reaching ramifications because the Netherlands enjoyed a 
privileged neutral status under treaties concluded by the two nations in the late 
seventeenth century. The Dutch moreover were prepared to defend their neutral 
rights vigorously against claims that they were trading for the enemy rather than with 
him. Finally, the paper examines the role played by the jurisprudence of Cornelius 
van Bynkershoek in legitimating the highhandedness of the British Admiralty in 
intercepting Dutch ships and challenging the treaty regime governing Dutch trading 
rights. Historically, these developments mark a fundamental shift in international 
law from its natural law foundations toward modern legal positivism.
Privatising Commercial Warfare
There can be no clearer proof of the extent to which commerce had become 
integrated into affairs of state during the eighteenth century than its use as a weapon 
in war. During the Seven Years’ War, destroying the enemy’s commerce was as 
effective a strategy as destroying his armies and arsenals, strangling him slowly 
by denying him the resources needed to sustain the war effort. This was by no 
means a novel strategy. The great maritime wars of the seventeenth century were 
5 Julian S. Corbett, The Seven Years’ War: A Study in British Combined Strategy (London: The 
Folio Society, 2001), p. 2.
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waged in accordance with this very principle.6 But what distinguished commercial 
warfare during the Seven Years’ War from its prosecution in any earlier struggle 
was the sheer scale of the conflict. The bounds of the Seven Years’ War were 
coterminous with European imperium, spanning the world’s oceans and waged on 
three continents, prefiguring the total wars of the twentieth century in their scale.7 
Whereas the commerce-destroying warfare of the seventeenth century had been, 
as Alfred Thayer Mahan memorably described it, “unsubstantial and evanescent”8 
because it could not be meaningfully sustained far from its base of operations 
in the home country, by the eighteenth century the great commercial powers of 
Europe had highly developed ports in the far reaches of their empires from which to 
prosecute the destruction of commerce. For the first time in the history of western 
warfare, guerre de course, or commerce-destroying, became a fully integrated 
strategic component in a truly global conflict. The full consequences of this were 
felt not only by the belligerent powers of Europe, but by the neutral powers as well.
The most effective way to destroy the enemy’s trade was not by prowling the 
open seas for his ships, but by patrolling his coastlines and maintaining tight 
blockades. By 1758 the British blockade of French colonial ports had become 
so effective that France opened its colonial trade, a trade long closed to all but 
French-flagged ships, to the ships of neutral nations.9 Blockade, as enforced in 
the eighteenth century, did not necessarily mean that no ships could pass through 
the British patrols. It meant only that French ships and neutral vessels carrying 
contraband could not enter French ports.10 This presented neutral states with 
lucrative opportunities. Not only could they carry on their customary peacetime 
trade in time of war, but they could also profit handsomely from the newly opened 
colonial trade from which they had formerly been excluded. This confounded the 
6 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500–1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe 
(London: Routledge, 1999); Roger Hainsworth and Christine Churches, The Anglo-Dutch Naval 
Wars, 1652–1674 (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton Publishing, Ltd., 1998); J. R. Jones, The Anglo-
Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1996).
7 Paul Kennedy has persuasively argued that “the Seven Years War can lay a far stronger claim 
to the title of the first world war than many others before or since[.]” Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Humanity Books, 2006), p. 98. Franz Szabo’s recently 
published history of the Seven Years’ War not only shows how the war was a precursor to the total 
wars of the twentieth century, but how German expansionism of the last century mirrored Prussian 
expansionism of the eighteenth. Franz A. J. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe 1756–1763 
(London: Longman, 2008).
8 A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783 (New York: Hill & Wang, 
1962), p. 116.
9 It was not until late 1759 that the ports of France were sealed under blockade in the wake of the 
Battle of Quiberon Bay. Fred Anderson, The Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of 
Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 (New York: Vintage, 2001), pp. 381–3.
10 For discussion of eighteenth-century understandings of the lawful scale of blockade, see 
Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739–1763 (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 
1975), pp. 163–5. The scale of a naval blockade could vary according to the orders issued by the 
Admiralty. During the Seven Years’ War, Admiral Hawke permitted any neutral vessels to enter 
enemy ports so long as they were not carrying contraband. Corbett, Seven Years’ War, p. 381.
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British, who found their obligation to respect the neutral’s right to trade in direct 
conflict with their war goals and naval strategy.
One of the fiercest struggles Britain fought during the Seven Years’ War took 
place on the waters of the West Indies, for it was from French Caribbean colonies 
that France obtained many of the materials needed to wage war.11 Sugar, cotton, 
indigo, and coffee not only helped feed and clothe France’s civilian and military 
populations, but also helped sustain a commercial economy increasingly feeling 
the strain of war. Commerce-destruction was not just a matter of destroying the 
enemy’s trade, but also of damaging his credit. If creditors could not rely on regular 
deliveries of cargo, and ship insurers were exposed to liability for the risk of ships’ 
capture and condemnation, commerce destruction could destabilize the entire credit 
system of a country.12 With the goal of maximum disruption (if not destruction) of 
the enemy’s economy in sight, Britain imposed tight blockades on French colonial 
ports and aggressively seized French ships and cargoes on the high seas. But 
the British Navy alone could not interdict French trade routes the world over and 
wage effective naval warfare at the same time.13 Having a robust merchant marine, 
Britain was able to call upon the assistance of privateers in intercepting French 
commerce. The arrangement not only improved the efficiency of the Royal Navy 
but also proved highly lucrative for the crown and for privateers, who shared the 
proceeds from the sale of condemned ships and cargo.14
Privateering was an effective way for governments to privatise commercial 
warfare, leaving fleets free to concentrate on enemy sea power. English 
privateering in some respects predated the emergence of the Royal Navy.15 King 
Henry IV began licensing merchants to act as privateers as early as 1406 as a 
means of supplementing the royal fleet.16 The Admiralty would issue letters of 
marque authorising private ships to undertake on the high seas certain activities 
11 Henry Lawrence Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution (New York: Caldwell, 
1954), vol. 8, pp. 65–7.
12 Corbett, Seven Years’ War, pp. 639–40.
13 A.T. Mahan calculated that at the outbreak of war, the British Navy outnumbered the French 
Navy two to one. Britain had 130 ships of the line to the France’s 63, of which 18 were in poor 
condition. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 257. See also Kennedy, Rise and Fall of 
British Naval Mastery, pp. 99–100. Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), pp. 121–2.
14 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, pp. 1–17. Privateering was so lucrative that during 
the Seven Years’ War sailors in the Royal Navy were known to desert the Service in order to join 
the crews of privateer vessels. Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution (New York: 
Caldwell, 1967), vol. 7, p. 70. 
15 In the early 1500s, when European maritime powers were just beginning to assemble permanent 
royal navies, fleets of privateers were an efficient way to help project state power onto the seas. 
Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 40–53. Privateers were so effective that by the early seventeenth century, 
Spain’s privateering fleet was between five and six times the size of the armada. R. A. Stradling, 
The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568–1668 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 218.
16 R. G. Marsden, Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea (London: Navy Records 
Society, 1915), vol. 1, pp. 115–18.
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otherwise prohibited by the customary law of the sea. Although officered and 
manned by civilians, privateers could wreak havoc on enemy shipping. They could 
also interdict and seize neutral vessels thought to be participating in contraband 
trade. Captured vessels would be brought to the nearest port having a prize court 
for adjudication of the status of the capture. The very existence of privateering 
represented a serious derogation from traditional notions of freedom of the high 
seas, but it was an expedient that the great maritime powers found useful and 
sometimes indispensable during most of the early-modern period.17
In Britain, privateers also relieved taxpayers of some of the burden that global 
warfare placed on the public debt. James Marriott praised them thus:
Men who subscribe their Fortunes to aid the Necessities of the State, deserve and 
receive its favours. When that is done in the ordinary Loans, the Equipments are 
the Equipments of the Government; the Losses are the Losses of the Community, 
the Particulars who have given aid, are secure in the Public Credit, and the Faith of 
Parliament. But when private persons, commissioned by the State to make War upon 
its Enemies, equip and maintain, they are liable to every loss from the Inclemency of 
the Winds and Seas, and the Superiority of the Enemy, while the Advantages they 
receive are dearly earned, at the expence of their single Treasure; and their Blood is 
spilled for the General Service, without the hopes of Honour or Advancement.18
Marriott’s observation surely resonated with a contemporary audience familiar 
with the eighteenth-century debate over the enormous public debt incurred in the 
course of Britain’s commercial wars.19 Indeed, it evoked Daniel Defoe’s description 
of credit as a virtuous and stabilising force in political life: “Credit is not dependant 
on the Person of the Sovereign, upon a Ministry, or upon this or that Management; 
but upon the Honour of the Publick Administration in General, and the Justice of 
17 There is a tendency among historians and lawyers alike to equate privateering with piracy, an 
equation both inaccurate and unhelpful. The mistake is understandable. Abuses by privateers have 
been well-documented and, in the case of Sir Francis Drake, become the stuff of folklore. Paul E. J. 
Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England, 1544–1604 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 80–8, 110–11, 135–7. John Cummins, Francis Drake: Lives of a 
Hero (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995). By the time the practice of privateering was abolished 
by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, the phrase “privateer practice” had become synonymous with 
misconduct. W. H. Smyth, The Sailor’s Lexicon (New York: Hearst, 2005), p. 544. Nevertheless, the 
differences between the pirate and the privateer were pronounced. Pirates were stateless, lawless 
criminals, while privateers were expected to operate by and under the laws of their commissioning 
state. When they did not, privateers were frequently held accountable in the courts of justice of 
their commissioning state and/or their governments agreed to pay damages for their depredations 
through diplomatic channels. Pirates, on the other hand, were and remain hostes humani generis, 
enemies of all humankind. Maintaining this distinction is important not only for the sake of historical 
accuracy, but because of the example that the regulation of privateering can provide to an age where 
outsourcing wartime activities to private security companies has become the norm. Mercenaries are 
no longer shades from the past; they have become modern battlefield realities. 
18 Marriott, Letter to the Dutch Merchants, p. 28.
19 J. G. A. Pocock, “Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy: The Augustan Debate over Land, Trade 
and Credit,” The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 423–61.
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Parliament in Particular, in keeping whole the Interest of those who have ventured 
their Estates upon the Publick Faith[.]”20
The privatisation of commercial warfare meant the privatisation of expenses that 
would otherwise have been borne by the public. Privateers undertook enormous 
personal risks that would normally have been borne by the state, but without the 
many credit advantages normally at the disposal of government. In order to create 
incentives for civilians to risk their private resources on helping wage a public war, 
the political community had to put the credit of its courts behind them. A privateer 
had to be assured that if he staked his life and property on a capture at sea, he 
could count on a fair hearing when he brought his prize into port. Thus while in war 
“Negotiations, Conventions, Explanations and other Methods of putting an End to 
these Contests, may be entered into by the Two Nations […] things will, and must 
run in the usual, and legal Channels of Justice” for the privateers.21 Their rights had 
to be adjudicated by judges in the courts, not by diplomats in the council chambers. 
But how could the British government persuade neutrals that its prize courts 
were unbiased in their dispensation of justice, and that privateers would not be 
awarded a “home-court” advantage? The law of nations and treaty law should, 
at least in theory, have provided a stable and predictable body of law for the 
resolution of prize disputes, regardless of the state to which the court belonged.22 
In practice, though, the application of different doctrines of neutral trading rights 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction prevented such a system of law from developing. 
Thus while an English lawyer might argue that British prize courts were “not less 
the Courts of the Captured, than of the Captor”,23 a member of the Dutch States 
General might reasonably disagree and argue that the outcome of prize cases 
“should not depend on the opinion of a judge, but should be settled according to 
the mutual consent of the two powers.”24
What the British prize courts did have in common with their continental 
counterparts, though, was their reliance on the civil law. Until 1876, when admiralty 
20 Cited in Pocock, “Neo-Machiavellian Political Economy”, p. 455. By contrast, in 1742 David 
Hume argued that far from promoting public virtue, the public debt vitiated government: “The source 
of degeneracy, which may be remarked in free governments, consists in the practice of contracting 
debt, and mortgaging the public revenues, by which taxes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, 
and all the property of the state be brought into the hands of the public.” David Hume, Essays Moral, 
Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 1.XII.11.
21 Marriott, Letter to the Dutch Merchants, p. 28. 
22 A classic text on the law of admiralty notes, “By the law of nations and treaties, every nation is 
answerable to the other for all injuries done by sea or land, or in fresh waters, or in any port. Mutual 
convenience, eternal principles of justice, wise policy, and the consent of nations, have established 
a system of procedure, a code of law, and a court for the trial of prizes. Every country sues in those 
courts of the others, which are all governed by one and the same law, equally known to each.” Arthur 
Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law, and of the Law of the Admiralty (2nd ed., London: J. 
Butterworth 1802), pp. 224–5.
23 James Marriott, The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered (London: R. & J. Dodsley, 1759), p. 36.
24 Extrait du Regitre des Resolutions de Leurs Hautes puissances, Les Seignurs Etats generaux 
des provinces Unies des pais bas. Du Jeudi le 25 Janvier 1759, (p. 5). State Papers, Holland, 
84/482. London. Public Records Office. Original: “ne doit pas dépendre de l’opinion de juge mais 
qu’elle doit uniquement être reglée par le consentement mutuél des deux Puissances”.
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jurisdiction was absorbed into the High Court of England and Wales, the British 
courts of admiralty were civil law courts that coexisted with the common law courts. 
Justinian’s Institutes carried more legal weight than Coke’s Institutes in British courts 
of admiralty.25 And just as common lawyers in the nineteenth century cited the 
oracular authority of Coke and Blackstone, so admiralty lawyers of the eighteenth 
century cited Grotius and Bynkershoek. In training and expertise, admiralty lawyers 
in England had more in common with their continental counterparts than they did 
with the common lawyers of their homeland. Thus the admiralties of Europe’s great 
maritime powers spoke to one another in the same legal language; their problem 
was that they communicated different messages.
The British government viewed the problem of Dutch commerce as primarily 
legal rather than diplomatic. Dutch shippers, they argued, had legal obligations for 
which British prize courts were the best forum of adjudication. Historically, prize law 
had developed through cases involving private individuals (namely, the ship and 
cargo owners) as respondents, and a representative of the captor (the Royal Navy) 
as claimant. Thus prize courts tended to view the cases before them primarily as 
private property disputes and incidentally as matters of state policy. If the captures 
of the Seven Years’ War had simply been a matter of intercepting enemy cargo 
for defensive purposes, most prize cases could probably have been resolved 
diplomatically. But heavy reliance on privateering injected another set of interests 
into prize cases: those of the privateer. This complicated matters considerably, for 
the interests of English privateers were primarily financial and coincided with those 
of the state only insofar as both stood to profit from condemnation proceedings.
The fiercely independent nature of judicial power in eighteenth-century Britain 
cannot be discounted in evaluating prize proceedings. While the Admiralty courts’ 
prize jurisdiction came from the Crown, that is precisely where the Crown’s influence 
over prize proceedings ended. The influence of Parliament was similarly limited. It 
might issue prize commissions and enact legislation governing the allocation of 
prize proceeds, but the actual process of adjudication was completely in the hands 
of prize court judges. The consequences of this separation of powers cut both ways. 
On one hand, colonial prize courts dispensed justice by their own lights without 
overt political interference. This meant at best rough and ready justice; at worst, it 
meant no justice at all.26 In case of the latter, an appeals process was in place that 
led ultimately to the Lords Commissioners of Prize Appeals, a special committee of 
the Privy Council composed of lawyers and statesmen. While military events and 
25 If anything, there was great tension between the Admiralty and Coke, who advocated the 
absorption of admiralty jurisdiction into the common law courts. Nicholas J. Healy, David J. Sharpe, 
and David B. Sharpe, Cases and Materials on Admiralty (4th ed., St. Paul MN: Thompson West, 
2006), pp. 3–4.
26 The examples of colonial proceedings enumerated by Richard Pares border on the farcical. “The 
Vice-Admiralty court at Minorca seems to have been a perfect bear-garden,” he writes. “Judge Font 
complained that captors carried away prizes which he had acquitted; one of their agents unloaded a 
cargo without taking any legal steps to have it condemned, and sold it in spite of a prohibition from 
the court.” Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, p. 83.
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diplomatic sensitivities at times coloured their decisions, the Lords Commissioners 
had to provide reasoned decisions based on existing law. In their judicial capacity 
at least, they were not directly subject to royal influence. This was certainly not the 
case in France, where the King himself was the ultimate arbiter of prize appeals. 
The relative independence of the British prize courts was a source of ongoing 
tension between the Dutch and British governments. When Dutch agents sought 
the Crown’s intervention on their behalf in prize disputes, royal officials responded 
that the Crown had no jurisdiction in such matters. Aggrieved parties had to appeal 
adverse prize decisions, a cumbersome business requiring much patience and 
costly legal representation in London.27 As far as Dutch merchants were concerned, 
a simple word to the King appealing to his sense of justice would have been far 
more efficient. But British officialdom was adamant. Any appeal had to be made 
to the Lords Commissioners of Prize Appeal because, as the British Ambassador 
to the Hague put it, the King of England “was ty’d up by the Laws, now in being, 
and […] without a Legal Trial, His Majesty could not give up the Pretensions of any 
Captor[.]”28
Independent prize courts were seen as essential pillars upholding both the 
liberty and commercial prosperity of Britain. Charles Jenkinson wrote,
it must always be the Interest of England to protect the just Rights of Commerce, and to 
support those Principles which promote the Labours of Mankind, since she herself can 
only be Great from the virtuous Industry of her People. To obtain the largest Extent for 
the Exertion of this, is the Point to which all her Policy should tend; and if ever, forsaking 
these Maxims, she should seek to enlarge her Power by any Acts of Ambitious Injustice, 
may she then, for the Welfare of the human Race, cease to be any longer great or 
powerful! Her Courts of maritime Jurisdiction are more wisely calculated to preserve 
the Freedom of Navigation than those of any other Country; as they are not subject to 
the Controul of her executive Power, the Passions of her Princes or Ministers can never 
influence the Decisions of them[.]29
The idea that courts independent of arbitrary influence were essential to the 
preservation of political liberty had a long history in Britain. During the seventeenth 
century, it was the stuff that revolutions were made of. But what is unique to the 
27 British authorities were wholly unsympathetic to Dutch complaints about the grinding 
inefficiencies of the appeals process, stating, “if It is too troublesome or too expensive for private 
Persons to prosecute criminally, or to follow an appeal to the Lords Commissioners, surely it might 
have been worth the while for the States General themselves to have incurred so small a Change, 
before they taxed the justice of the whole Nation[.]” SP 84/482, Holdernesse to Yorke, 28 November 
1758. The British were likewise unsympathetic to complaints that privateering was making the cost 
of insurance almost prohibitive for Dutch traders. SP 84/482, Yorke to Holdernesse, 22 September 
1758; SP 84/482, Yorke to Holdernesse, 31 October 1758.
28 SP 84/482, Yorke to Holdernesse, 19 December 1758.
29 Charles Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great Britain with Respect 
to Neutrals in the Present War (Dublin: Hulton Bradley, 1759), p. 54. Jenkinson was elected MP for 
Cockermouth in 1761 and served as Under-Secretary of State during the final years of the Seven 
Years’ War. He subsequently became a Privy Councillor and served as President of the Board of 
Trade from 1786–1803.
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debate over the British prize courts during the Seven Years’ War is the claim 
that their independence is not only essential to political liberty, but also to robust 
international commerce. If the rights of international commerce were to be put on 
trial in time of war, they would have to be afforded fair and impartial justice.
During the War of the Austrian Succession, which had prepared the way 
for the Seven Years’ War, David Hume observed “that commerce can never 
flourish but in a free government[.]” The reason was “not because it is there less 
secure, but because it is less honourable. A subordination of ranks is absolutely 
necessary to the support of monarchy. Birth, titles, and place, must be honoured 
above industry and riches. And while these notions prevail, all the considerable 
traders will be tempted to throw up their commerce, in order to purchase some of 
those employments, to which privileges and honours are annexed.”30 Jenkinson’s 
argument in support of the prize courts follows in this vein: prize courts free from 
royal interference are also free from overweening ambition and avarice, the very 
qualities that vitiate commerce and poison industry. For as Jenkinson explained, 
“the System of Humanity is no where perfect, but in respect to Nations its Weakness 
is most apparent; the softer Ties of Natural Affection among these have little Effect 
[…] what Nature hath left imperfect; Ambition or Avarice will augment the Evil, 
Moderation may prevent it; every little Inconvenience must be patiently suffered, 
where a superior Right makes it necessary[.]”31 From the standpoint of the Dutch, 
prize proceedings may have amounted to more than a “little Inconvenience.” But 
when it came to Britain’s “superior right” to defend itself in war-the overarching 
reason of state that informed British wartime policy-they would have to suffer the 
workings of English justice, no matter how objectionable they found it.
The Problem of Dutch Neutral Trade
Sorely pressed by the British blockade, France began inviting neutral merchant 
ships to carry on the French West Indian trade on its behalf.32 The opportunity 
was a boon to Dutch merchants in particular because of the privileged status they 
enjoyed as neutrals under a 1674 treaty entered upon the conclusion of the Third 
Anglo-Dutch War.33 Under Article VIII of the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce 
30 Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, 1.XII.11.
31 Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government, pp. 55–6.
32 France also invited Dutch ships to trade for its Canadian territories, but without a Dutch foothold 
in North America the devices used in the West Indies were of little use. Jonathan R. Dull, The 
French Navy and the Seven Years’ War (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 143. 
The assumption of the French West Indies trade by the Dutch was vexing enough to the British. 
Secretary of State Holdernesse complained that St. Eustatius and Curaçao, once little more than 
“barren settlements[,]” were now transformed into “grand magazines for the Produce of Martinico 
and St. Domingo” with “vast fleets [] now sailing continually from those insignificant Ports laden with 
Enemy’s Property.” SP 84/483, Holdernesse to Yorke, 9 February 1759.
33 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, 10 December 1674, The Consolidated Treaty Series, ed. 
Clive R. Parry (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana 1969), vol. 13, p. 255.
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between England and the Netherlands, all goods found on Dutch ships would “be 
accounted clear and free, although the whole lading, or any part thereof, by just 
title of propriety, shall belong to the enemies of his Majesty[.]”34 The treaty firmly 
established the privilege of free ships, free goods for the Dutch.35 Also, Article 
VII provided that the customary rule of “infection” would not apply to Dutch ships. 
Under the rule, the presence of any contraband was presumed to contaminate all 
goods aboard a neutral ship (and, indeed, the ship itself) with its illicit character. 
Consequently, everything would be subject to condemnation as prize property. But 
the Treaty provided that free ships “shall not, upon pretence of their being infected 
by such prohibited goods [namely, contraband as defined by Art. III of the treaty], 
be detained, much less confiscated for lawful prize.”36 Dutch traders could thus 
afford to take the risk of transporting contraband goods for France without fearing 
the forfeiture of their own ships and cargoes. 
In short, the 1674 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce created every incentive 
and eliminated every deterrent for the Dutch to undertake trade for the French 
given the conditions of the Seven Years’ War. For the first time, Dutch ships were 
welcome at French colonial ports in order to trade in French goods. And when 
those ports were rendered inaccessible by a British blockade, small French boats 
laden with commercial goods would slip through the blockade to meet Dutch 
trading vessels in the territorial waters of Dutch colonies. There, the goods would 
be loaded onto Dutch vessels bound for the Netherlands. The process, known as 
transhipping, caused British pamphleteers to lash out against the neutral Dutch for 
having “aided and counselled the Enemy, in every Method that might complete his 
Voyages through their Medium, with Safety, as they hoped, to him, and Impunity to 
themselves.”37
Thus Britain felt trapped by a treaty concession of its own making. Under 
the protection of free ships, free goods, French trade in colonial goods survived 
through a neutral proxy. At first, the most logical response for the British might have 
been to fight treaty with treaty: to respond to the Dutch invocation of the Treaty of 
1674 by invoking English rights under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Alliance of 1678. 
Under that agreement, the parties were bound in “strict alliance” both in peace and 
in war. Under Article IV, the parties pledged themselves to mutual defense by sea 
and by land. Most significantly, Article V stipulated, “The party not attacked shall 
break with the aggressor within two months after the rupture, using all means to 
34 Consolidated Treaty Series, ed. Parry, p. 255.
35 This doctrine held that non-contraband enemy goods aboard a neutral ship were to be considered 
free and thus not subject to confiscation. The doctrine was activated on a treaty-by-treaty basis 
during the seventeenth century as a means of circumventing the prevailing doctrine of robe, a rule 
established by Francis I that held that “la robe d’ennemy confisque celle d’amy”. Geoffrey Butler and 
Simon Maccoby, The Development of International Law (London: Longmans, 1928), pp. 269–71.
36 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, 10 December 1674, p. 255.
37 Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships Considered, p. 24.
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bring things to an accommodation.”38 Joseph Yorke, the British Ambassador to the 
Hague, tried repeatedly to get the Dutch to contribute forces under this treaty to 
no avail. Britain was the aggressor in this war, the Dutch claimed, and the treaty’s 
contribution requirement was therefore not triggered.39
But if the English believed that the treaty’s alliance requirements were indeed 
triggered and repudiated, why did they not treat the Dutch as enemies and thus 
treat Dutch trade as enemy trade? That is, why not confiscate it all, from ship to 
cargo? Richard Pares gives a very persuasive answer: by putting the Dutch in a 
position where they had clearly reneged on a treaty obligation, the British could 
renege in turn on their obligations under the Treaty of 1674.40 A further answer 
is that friendship was far more lucrative to the parties than enmity. There was a 
strong Anglophile party in the States General, so notwithstanding the difficulties 
Britain encountered in dealing with Dutch trade, an Anglophile Netherlands was 
infinitely preferable to one overrun by France. Furthermore, in a curious way the 
very purpose of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Alliance had become obsolete during 
the Seven Years’ War. The Protestant fear of a French invasion of the Netherlands 
was allayed by the fact that the French were more interested in turning the neutral 
status of the Dutch to their advantage than in conquering them.41 However, the 
State Papers for Holland suggest still another reason Britain may not have wished 
to press their claims under the Treaty of 1678 too forcefully. The fact is that in some 
ways the British profited from the very trade they sought to suppress. Just as the 
Dutch were more useful to the French as neutral traders than as subjects, they 
were also more useful to the English as neutral traders than as enemies.
On 17 August 1759, Joseph Yorke received instructions from Secretary of State 
Holdernesse instructing him to inquire into intelligence received at Whitehall. “[T]he 
Court of France,” he wrote, “is Endeavouring to procure 400 Pieces of Cannon 
38 Treaty of Defensive Alliance, 3 March 1678, The Consolidated Treaty Series, ed. Clive R. Parry 
(Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana, 1969), vol. 14, p. 311.
39 Corbett, Seven Years’ War, pp. 55, 59, 65–6.
40 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, pp. 243–6, 266–8. The tone of these claims is 
encapsulated in an exchange between Holdernesse and Hendrik Hop, the Dutch representative in 
London, which occurred in September 1756. Hop approached the Secretary of State demanding the 
release of several ships captured by the British man of war, the Rochester. The States General had 
previously issued a memorial pursuant to this case, but England had yet to issue a reply. Holdernesse 
told Hop that he would have to continue waiting, for “it could not […] but appear extraordinary 
to the King, to find the States so very importunate for an answer […] when they seemed in no 
Haste to give One to That [which Yorke] had presented, reclaiming the defensive alliances equally 
in Force with the Treaty of 1674.” SP 84/475, Holdernesse to Yorke, 8 September 1756. This would 
become a recurring theme in British correspondence and literature of the period. In a dispatch to 
Yorke, Holdernesse wrote, “if the Treaty of 1678 remained unexecuted, That of 1674 was, of course, 
annulled: and though His Majesty, out of Friendship to the States General, has not yet rigorously 
exerted his Right, yet the Right Itself is neither impeached nor impaired by this friendly Delay[.]” 
SP 84/482, Holdernesse to Yorke, 29 November 1758. See also, Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships 
Considered, pp. 24–29 (“The Dutch therefore, as a Republic, having done no one Act towards 
complying with the several Duties which are placed to their account by the Spirit and by the Letter 
of every subsisting Treaty […] can [not] claim a Privilege founded only upon one Treaty.”)
41 Alice Clare Carter, Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667–1795 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1975), pp. 78–9.
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from Sweden; That it is intended they should be embarked at [Karlskrona] on 
Dutch Bottoms, which are to be freighted at Amsterdam, & sent to Sweden for that 
Purpose. One Grille a Merchant at Stockholm, and his Brother, likewise a Merchant 
at Amsterdam, are the Persons concerned in this Affair.”42 After preliminary 
investigation, Yorke put the Dutch government on notice that if it failed to prevent 
its subjects from carrying on this trade, Britain would be forced to stop and inspect 
all Dutch ships, regardless of whether they were suspected of being involved in 
trade to the French West Indies. He told Dutch Grand Pensionary Steyn of France’s 
determination “to make an arsenal of [his] Country”43 and warned that if Steyn 
failed to take every possible measure to ensure that his countrymen repudiated 
this illicit trade England would have no choice but to treat the Dutch as enemies.44
Steyn took immediate action. The Dutch Admiralties were prohibited from 
granting passports for cannon coming from Sweden, and the Chamber of 
Burgomasters at Amsterdam warned the City’s merchants that “if such an affair 
was known upon the Exchange, and any Interruption happened to the Navigation 
of the Republick upon it, they might expect to have their Houses pulled down about 
their Ears.”45 Yorke, for his part, kept abreast of the ships arriving in Amsterdam 
from Sweden. “There is one ship arrived […] with Cannon, which I watch narrowly,” 
he wrote, “and am persuaded, no steps can be taken with that bulky Commodity, 
without my being exactly informed of it[.]”46 But then came the rub: Yorke was not 
prepared to take any public measures against the ship or its cargo unless forced to 
“because we are continually purchasing Effects of the same hostile Nature in this 
Country, for Our own use, and by being too hasty, the King’s Service might suffer; 
The Apprehension of what may happen to their Navigation by disobliging us, is a 
solid Argument with these People, and of that I have a full Right to make all the use 
I can, after all the Complaisance his Majesty has had for the Republick.”47 In short, 
the British needed Dutch shipments of munitions as much as the French in order to 
sustain their war effort. To make enemies of the Dutch under these circumstances 
might cut off one of Britain’s own vital supply lines.
Amid this tangle of conflicting interests, negotiations between Britain and the 
Netherlands frequently ground to a halt as quickly as they later resumed. Three 
years of exasperated negotiations between Yorke and Dutch officials are vivid 
42 SP 84/485, Holdernesse to Yorke, 17 August 1759.
43 SP 84/485, Yorke to Holdernesse, 18 September 1759.
44 SP 84/485, Yorke to Holdernesse, 18 September 1759.
45 SP 84/485, Yorke to Holdernesse, 21 September 1759.
46 SP 84/485, Yorke to Holdernesse, 25 September 1759.
47 SP 84/485, Yorke to Holdernesse, 25 September 1759.
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proof of this.48 Because neither government was able to renegotiate the terms of 
the Treaty of 1674, the British instead resolved to give the scope of free ships, free 
goods as narrow a construction as possible. The doctrine’s applicability to enemy 
ports in Europe was not disputed; its applicability to colonial ports, ports which had 
not been open to Dutch trade at the time the treaty was concluded was another 
matter. So if the Dutch were now to undertake a new trade in French colonial 
goods, Britain argued, they would have to do so in good faith, trading with the 
enemy and not for him.
Article III the Treaty of 1674 prescribed an objective standard against which 
to measure the good faith of Dutch traders. In order to enter the territorial waters 
of either country, a ship would have to show a sea-brief (passport) containing the 
name of the ship, and the name and nationality of its owner. In order to justify 
stops at enemy ports, the ship would also have to show its bills of lading (coquets), 
documents from customs officers at the vessel’s port of departure describing its 
cargo. If the ship’s bills of lading demonstrated that it was carrying contraband, 
the ship could be landed and searched by officers of the admiralty. But under no 
circumstances was the captor’s crew to open, move or inspect the cargo at sea.49 
The trouble with this provision, at least from the British standpoint, was that 
suspect goods included only contraband as defined by the treaty. Coffee, sugar, 
cotton, and other French colonial goods were not among the articles then deemed 
contraband. By the admission of Holdernesse himself, this was one of the most 
problematic aspects of the treaty, but one whose limits the British would vigorously 
test. In a letter to Yorke of 28 November 1758, he wrote:
But there still remains one Point, which will, I fear, of all others, be the most difficult to 
adjust to mutual satisfaction; I mean, the Necessity there is of a stricter Examination 
of the good Faith of the Dutch Navigators, than is consistent with the literal Sense of 
the Treaty of 1674 or with the present Pretensions of the Dutch; and it is much to be 
lamented, that the various deceits, which some of the Dutch Traders have put into 
Practice, should make a vigorous Examination absolutely necessary, though perhaps 
to the Detriment of the fair Trader; and yet, necessary as it is that the Dutch Ship should 
be subject to Visitation, and even to be brought into Port for Examination, where there 
are strong suspicions of Fraud.50 
48 Alice Clare Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years’ War (Coral Gables FL: 
University of Miami Press, 1971), pp. 97–102; Alice Clare Carter, “How to Revise Treaties Without 
Negotiating: Common Sense, Mutual Fear and the Anglo-Dutch Trade Disputes of 1759,” Studies in 
Diplomatic History: essays in memory of David Bayne Horn, eds. Ragnhild Hatton & M. S. Anderson 
(Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1970), p. 214.
49 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, 10 December 1674, p. 255. Bills of lading had three legal 
functions: (1) as an acknowledgement or a receipt for goods; (2) as evidence of a contract by a 
shipowner for the transport of goods, and; (3) as a means of establishing property in goods. W. 
P. Bennet, The History and Present Position of the Bill of Lading as a Document of Title to Goods 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), pp. 5–8, 16. The forms for British and Dutch bills 
of lading are appended to the 1674 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Navigation and Commerce. 
50 SP 84/482, Holdernesse to Yorke.
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Dutch merchants were unwilling to allow the British any visitation rights more 
expansive than allowed by the letter of the 1674 treaty. So when diplomacy failed 
to settle the question of British visitation rights, Holdernesse decided to allow the 
Lords Commissioners of Prize Appeal to settle it instead.51
It is here possible to fill a gap in Pares’s account of neutrality in the Seven Years’ 
War: why a sudden swarming of privateers occurred in the waters of the St. Eustatius-
Holland trade route in 1758–1759. Pares writes, “There is no saying what prompted 
[the privateers] then. I can find no general order for the purpose in the Admiralty 
records, nor is it easy to point to any circumstance which caused the privateers to 
take up the practice. It became common within a few months, and almost universal 
after the condemnation of the Maria Teresa’s cargo in the High Court of Admiralty 
on August 17, 1758.”52 The answer is not to be found in the Admiralty records but 
in a report from Doctors’ Commons included in the State Papers and republished 
by Reginald Marsden in his volumes of documents on the law of the sea.53
The document is an advisory opinion of 3 May 1757 on the question of whether 
the King, on advice of the Privy Council, might prohibit privateers from stopping 
and seizing non-French ships or French goods found on those ships. Doctors’ 
Commons, as the seat of the civil law profession in England, wielded substantial 
influence over the practice of admiralty law.54 The authors of this particular opinion 
included Solicitor General Charles Yorke, Advocate General George Hay, and 
Advocate of the Admiralty Dr. John Bettesworth. The very people who advised the 
Lords Commissioners on matters of law were also advising practicing attorneys, 
and so their opinions shaped everything from courtroom advocacy to state policy. 
To the question of whether the Crown might prohibit privateers from capturing non-
French ships, the law officers answered, “If his Majesty was to order all captains of 
private ships of war not to seize or detain the ships of any other nation than those 
belonging to the French king or his subjects, his Majesty, we apprehend, would 
circumscribe the authority given by Parliament to attack, surprise, seize, and take 
generally any goods belonging to the French.”55 But the law officers went one step 
51 Tara Helfman, “Neutrality, the Law of Nations, and the Natural Law Tradition: A Study of the 
Seven Years’ War”, Yale Journal of International Law 30 (2005), pp. 554–58.
52 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, p. 211.
53 “Report of law officers and civilians as to the legality of a proposed Instruction to privateers not 
to seize ships and goods of enemies other than the French, having regard to the prize Act, 3 May 
1757”, Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea, ed. R. G. Marsden (London: Navy 
Records Society, 1916), vol. 2, pp. 381–82.
54 Doctors’ Commons had yet to become the “cosey, dozey, old-fashioned, time-forgotten, sleepy-
headed little family-party” described in David Copperfield. Indeed, Dickens has the title character 
comment, “it would be quite a soothing opiate to belong to it in any character – except perhaps as 
a suitor.” Charles Dickens, David Copperfield, (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1911), Part 1, p. 352. 
As civilian jurisdiction over matrimonial, testamentary, and admiralty cases was eroded by statute 
in the nineteenth century, so too was the authority and vitality of Doctors’ Commons. See e.g. G. D. 
Squibb, Doctors’ Commons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
55 Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty and on Appeal Therefrom, ed. 
Reginald G. Marsden (London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. 1885), p. 204.
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further, addressing whether the Crown had the power to prohibit privateers from 
stopping and seizing the ships of privileged neutrals. The officers stated, “we are 
of opinion that such an Instruction may be lawfully given, and consistently with the 
Act of Parliament given to seize or detain any ships and vessels of such nations as 
are entitled to the privilege of carrying enemies’ goods by particular treaties with 
his Majesty.”56 
This may have come as promising news to Dutch merchants, but it also sent a 
clear signal to privateers: while the crown reserved the right to limit their conduct 
with respect to neutral ships, it was not going to do so in the near future. From the 
time the opinion was handed down in May 1757 to the time aggressive privateering 
began in the St. Eustatius trade in late 1757, the Crown promulgated no orders 
limiting the conduct of privateers with respect to Dutch ships. Here, the Crown’s 
silence sent a permissive signal to British privateers: capture what you will, but 
remember that you do so only at the pleasure of His Majesty. It was in the shadow 
of this opinion that the Dutch ships, the Maria Teresa and the Novum Aratrum were 
captured and adjudicated. In these two cases, the Lords Commissioners of Prize 
Appeal stopped short of doing away with free ships, free goods altogether. 
In 1758, the Maria Teresa set sail from Amsterdam to Cork, where it took on a 
cargo of provisions. It then set sail for St. Eustatius, where it put part of its cargo 
onto barques off shore and unloaded the rest in port. It also took on cargo from 
those barques. The ship was captured and brought to the Court of Admiralty for 
condemnation on the charge that it had been trading with France. Notwithstanding 
the fact that there was no proof that the barques with which the Maria Teresa 
had traded were French, the Court of Admiralty condemned the cargo and the 
ordered the ship restored to its Dutch owners. The claimants appealed to the Lords 
Commissioners and, on 29 March 1759, the lower court’s ruling was overturned. 
In the absence of evidence that the barques were French, the Commissioners 
ruled, the cargo had to be restored to its Dutch claimants.57 In this way the Lords 
Commissioners placed the burden of proving a cargo’s enemy nationality squarely 
upon the captor and the free ships, free goods doctrine was not called into question.
Thus when presented with a timely opportunity to prohibit privateers from 
capturing neutral ships pursuant to an opinion of Doctors’ Commons, the King 
declined to do so. With the States General demanding that the King call off his 
privateers, the Crown’s silence in the wake of the Maria Teresa incident sent a 
clear signal to the Dutch and to the privateers: Dutch traders in the West Indies 
would remain fair game. But there was now a downside for the captors. If privateers 
56 Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty, ed. Marsden, p. 204.
57 Reports of Cases Determined by the High Court of Admiralty, ed. Marsden, p. 204. News of the 
ruling was received warmly in the Netherlands. Yorke wrote that the decision “upon the ship Maria 
Theresa, has given so universal a Satisfaction in this country, that it is hardly to be imagin’d, and 
they declare every where, that after this Proof, they have had of the Equity and Friendship of the 
British Nation, they shall be very glad to come to any reasonable Terms of Accommodation.” Yorke 
to Holdernesse, 6 April 1759; PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/484. The spirit of accommodation was 
short-lived, however, as the case did not resolve the underlying problems relating to neutral trade.
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brought seized ships to the prize courts without being able to prove the origin of the 
cargo, all their efforts and expense would have been for naught. Capturing vessels 
on the high seas was no easy enterprise, and the risks involved in taking a ship at 
sea only to lose it at port were usually not worth taking.
A different situation arose in the case of the Novum Aratrum, which challenged 
the doctrine of free ships, free goods altogether. While navigating the sea lanes 
just off St. Eustatius, the Novum Aratrum took on cargo out of three barques. 
From two it took on sugar, the origin of which was unspecified, and from the third 
it took on coffee that had come from either Martinique or Guadalupe. The ship 
subsequently stopped at St. Eustatius, where Dutch laders put aboard a cargo 
destined for Amsterdam. The circumstances of the ship’s capture are unclear, 
but captured it was and brought to England for adjudication before the Court of 
Admiralty. No documentation was available aboard the ship to prove the ownership 
of most of the cargo and, with the exception of a small amount of property laded 
at the port of St. Eustatius, no one was willing to come forward to claim it. Thus 
the nationality of the cargo was mixed, some French and some Dutch, embodying 
the very predicament that one pamphleteer of the Seven Years’ War deplored: “the 
properties of Dutchmen and Frenchmen have become as inseparably blended as 
their national characters, in the American world, have long been equivocal.”58 
From a procedural standpoint, this left the admiralty judge in an interesting 
predicament: how was he to treat an undocumented mixed cargo aboard a neutral 
ship? The prize court’s response at trial was surprising. Rather than adjudge the 
nationality of the cargo on the basis of its final destination (Amsterdam), the court 
determined its nationality on the basis of its origin. The trial judge issued an interim 
order restoring the ship to its Dutch owners but requiring that the cargo be held in 
England until the claimants distinguished which parts of it were taken from the shore 
of St. Eustatius and which from the barques from French colonies. The claimant, 
who is not identified on the record, made no such showing and so, according to 
the report of the case, on 24 February 1759 “the Judge pronounced that all the 
goods in said ship taken ought to be presumed to belong to the French King or his 
subjects, and condemned the same to the captor (emphasis added).”59 
This unprecedented outcome may have been the result of a legal strategy that 
backfired for the claimants. It is possible that the claimants made a risky calculation 
at trial: if they complied with the Court’s order and distinguished the origins of the 
ship’s cargo, surely only the cargo that had originated in the French Indies and had 
been brought to the Novum Aratrum on French barques would be confiscated. But 
if they did not disclose the respective origins of the cargo, the court might be forced 
to release the entire cargo on the basis of the traditional rule that the nationality of 
goods was to be determined by their destination and not their origin. The possibility 
58 Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships Considered, p. 20. 
59 Reports of Cases, ed. Marsden, p. 205.
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that the court would apply an entirely new rule that, absent proof of its neutrality, 
the entire cargo belonged to the enemy was totally unexpected. 
But it did not take long for the Lords Commissioners to overturn the judgment. In 
a hearing on 24 May 1759, which Dutch envoy to England Mr. van de Poll personally 
observed,60 the Lords ruled “that the direction given by the Judge of the Admiralty, 
11th October 1758, and the several continuances thereof, were irregular and 
erroneous[.]”61 The Lords instructed that part of the cargo (presumably whatever 
had been taken on from the port at St. Eustatius) be restored to the claimants 
and the origins of the remainder be pleaded and proven within a month. In effect, 
the goods taken on at the Dutch colony were presumptively Dutch property while 
the nationality of the goods taken on from the barques was to be re-adjudicated, 
buying time for the Admiralty and the Ambassadors alike. 
Back in The Hague, Yorke was watching the case as closely as the interested 
merchants. He was cautiously optimistic that the Dutch would receive the ruling 
favorably. He wrote: “Upon the whole, I believe the People here will not be dissatisfied, 
tho’ I see where the Shoe pinches, which is the Hopes that they had, and some 
still may entertain, that the French Effects, which came from their Islands, before 
England had declared itself, would be sufficiently cover’d by their Bottoms[.]”62 The 
Court had effectively upheld a presumption that undocumented goods laded onto 
a neutral ship in a neutral colony were neutral goods and therefore not subject to 
confiscation. This was entirely consistent with the traditional rule of free ships, free 
goods. But the Court of Appeals left open the more sensitive question of the status 
of French goods laded immediately off the coast of a neutral colony. Were goods 
laded just off the coast of St. Eustatius to enjoy the same privilege of presumptive 
neutrality as goods laded directly from the shore of the colony? 
The Court’s May 1759 decision left the latter question open to the relief of some 
and the consternation of others. Yorke explained:
The sentiments are […] divided upon the sentence given by the Lords of Appeal, 
upon the Ship the Novum Aratrum. At Rotterdam they seem better satisfied than at 
Amsterdam, for they say in the latter that if the Captor could not prove the Effects to be 
French Property, they ought to be released, even supposing the Distinction between 
French and Dutch Property, to have been admitted by both Sides, for what was past. But 
in this Case, where the Bottom was Dutch, in a voyage to and from a Dutch settlement, 
without any previous Declaration on the part of England, some Indulgence should be 
shewed their Merchants, who did not imagine that trade to be obnoxious to England, 
that where the Presumption is in their Favor, which they suppose upon the Captor’s 
producing sufficient Proof, they think their Goods ought to be released, otherwise they 
can have no Rule to go by, and the Captors may keep them in Suspence, and Increase 
their Expence, till the Ships and Cargoes are no longer worth suing for. They are at the 
60 SP 84/484, Yorke to Holdernesse, 1 June 1759. 
61 Reports of Cases, ed. Marsden, p. 205.
62 SP 84/484, Yorke to Holdernesse, 29 May 1759.
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same time extremely pleased with the Decision of the Court, upon what is put on Board 
out of Barks, and off the Shore of their Islands.63
The trouble was that no one came forward to plead and prove the ownership of the 
remaining cargo. Not until a year later, on 1 July 1760, did the Lords finally restore 
the remainder of the cargo to the claimant. In fact, it was the proctor who prosecuted 
the case who agreed to the arrangement. The reason for this complete about-face 
on the status of French goods on Dutch ships arose not in the courtroom but on the 
battlefield. A great deal had changed between 1758 and 1760. By 1759 Britain had 
all but crushed the French navy and the French merchant marine were paralyzed 
within blockaded harbors.64 In the spring of that year, Britain captured the islands 
of Guadeloupe and Marie Galante.65 With the French Caribbean trade all but gone, 
the Lords Commissioner could afford to be more conciliatory than before in dealing 
with the Dutch. Thus the rule that had defined Dutch privileged neutrality did not 
die. Rather, its strength was diluted by concurrent developments.
Trading For the Enemy
While the British courts of admiralty were adjudicating the scope of neutral trading 
rights, Yorke was grappling with “the Impossibility of obtaining Peace for Europe, 
if even our Friends, under a Pretence of Neutrality carr[y] on all the Trade of our 
Enemies.”66 For Britain, the problem was not the historic right of neutral merchants 
to trade their own goods with belligerents in time of war but rather the newly claimed 
right of neutral traders to carry the enemy’s colonial trade. As Charles Jenkinson 
explained, 
The Liberty of Navigation in fair Construction, can mean no more than the Right of 
carrying to any Mart unmolested, the Product of one’s own Country or Labour, and 
bringing back the Emoluments of it; But can it be Lawful that you should extend this 
right to my Detriment; and when it was meant only for your own Advantage, that you 
should exert it in the Cause of my Enemy? […] If you mean, that your own Commerce 
ought to be Free, the Right is not in the least denied you; but if under this Disguise 
you intend to convey Freedom to the Commerce of the Enemy, what Policy or what 
Justice can require it. […] But can any Right from hence arise, that you should take 
Occasion from the War itself to constitute a new Species of Traffic, which in Peace you 
never enjoyed, and which the Necessity of One Party is obliged to grant you, to the 
Detriment, perhaps the Destruction, of the Other?67
63 SP 84/484, Yorke to Holdernesse, 1 June 1759.
64 James C. Riley, The Seven Years’ War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and 
Financial Toll (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 80–3.
65 Szabo, Seven Years War in Europe, p. 256.
66 SP 84/482, Yorke to Holdernesse, 15 December 1758.
67 Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government, pp. 22–23. 
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This new state of affairs required that Britain reconsider the prevailing neutral rights 
regime by revisiting the very meaning of neutrality.
Richard Lee, who might charitably be described as a translator of Bynkershoek 
or, less charitably, as “an inferior hack writer of the Seven Years’ War,”68 injected into 
the debate a useful intellectual framework within which to think about the problem of 
privileged neutrality. His 1759 Treatise of Captures in War was carefully patterned 
after the first book of Cornelius van Bynkershoek’s Questions of Public Law and, 
for the most part, the texts are identical. But where differences do occur, they are 
striking. Most notable is an original passage that Lee inserted into Bynkershoek’s 
text in which he characterized the contemporary problem of Dutch neutrality as 
follows: 
though the neutral power may justly be allowed to trade with the enemy, under certain 
restrictions; yet it cannot possibly be conceived to be lawful to trade for him under 
sanction of their name. […] Such is the present practice of the Dutch, who not only 
carry Provisions to the Enemy, but also assist them in bringing the Produce of their 
American colonies to Europe in Dutch vessels; and when they are detected and the 
cargoes condemned, they complain of depredations, and what not? But however highly 
they may complain, they are certainly acting against the Rules of Neutrality, and may, 
therefore, be very justly prevented by seizing the ships and condemning the cargoes 
whenever they appear to be the property if the enemy.69 
The Dutch, he argued, were not engaging in a genuine exchange of commercial 
goods (trading with the enemy) but had assumed a carrying trade on behalf of 
France by undertaking a colonial trade that the French could no longer carry out 
themselves (trading for the enemy.) 
But why was this conduct contrary to neutrality? Did non-combatancy alone 
define neutrality, or was something more required? Here British pamphleteers 
began to revisit the very meaning of neutrality by way of Bynkershoek, who famously 
wrote that “the question of justice and injustice does not concern the neutral, and 
it is not his duty to sit in judgment between his friends who may be fighting each 
other, and to grant or deny anything to either belligerent through considerations 
of justice.”70 To do so would be entirely contrary to the nature of neutrality, for 
to Bynkershoek the neutral was truly a medius, an entity literally caught in the 
middle.71 This conception of neutrality, which Lee echoed almost verbatim,72 was 
a direct challenge to the prevailing view advanced by Hugo Grotius in The Rights 
of War and Peace, which conceived of the neutral as non hostes, a non-enemy or 
68 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, p. 155. 
69 Richard Lee, A Treatise of Captures in War (London: W. Sandby, 1759), pp. 142–3.
70 Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, tr. Frank Tenney (Oxford: Clarendon 
1930), vol. 2, p. 61.
71 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 60. 
72 Lee, Treatise of Captures in War, pp. 137–8.
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non-belligerent. Grotius wrote, “it is the Duty of those that are not engaged in the 
War to sit still and do nothing, that may strengthen him that prosecutes an ill Cause, 
or to hinder the Motions of him that hath Justice on his Side. […] But in a dubious 
Cause to behave themselves alike to both Parties[.]”73 
These differing views of neutrality stemmed from the writers’ different views of 
the state of war itself. To Bynkershoek, “war is by its very nature so general that 
it cannot be waged within set limits.”74 It must be prosecuted on the assumption 
that the enemy deserves to be destroyed. “We make war,” he wrote, “because we 
think that our enemy, by the injury he has done us, has merited the destruction of 
himself and his people.” That said, “does it matter by what means we accomplish 
it?”75 Thus Bynkershoek did not offer a conception of just war fought by morally just 
means. Any means employed in waging a war to “defend or recover one’s own’ ( jus 
suum) were lawful.76 In this spirit Bynkershoek wrote that, absent an agreement to 
the contrary, there is no ground upon which a sovereign state may interfere in the 
affairs of another. He explained, “[I]t is by no means right to interfere in another’s 
affairs. When neither friend has made any engagement with us why should princes, 
absolutely independent, stand or fall by our judgment? It is not our duty to avenge 
all the wrongs of every sovereign; it is sufficient for us to avenge our own and those 
of our allies.”77 Thus the neutral lacks the moral authority to impose his sense of 
justice on the belligerents.
This theory of neutrality was particularly compelling to the British during the 
Seven Years’ War not only because of its implications for neutral trading rights, 
but because it avoided precisely the sort of self-multiplying war that Britain feared. 
Yorke explained that in the present conflict, the very balance of global power was 
at stake: 
every impartial Person who examines the State of Our Force, by Sea and that of 
Europe, will be convinced that France could never have a fairer opportunity to awaken 
the jealousy of all Nations, against Our Power by Sea, & to tempt them to unite, to keep 
it within proper Bounds; I am sorry to see them gain so much Ground as they do, both 
[in the Netherlands] and in Denmark, and when once the Flame catches, it will soon 
spread much wider. 
The British were acutely aware of the potential for the dispute over neutral trading 
rights to intensify the global conflagration already underway. As Yorke’s comment 
73 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2005), vol. III, p. 1525. 
74 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 16.
75 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 16.
76 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 17. However, Bynkershoek categorically prohibits 
perfidy on the ground that once belligerents enter into a compact, their legal status changes. They 
are no longer enemies and the rules governing their conduct must change accordingly. Bynkershoek, 
Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 16.
77 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 62.
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demonstrates, the opening of the French colonial trade exacerbated the jealousy 
of trade of which Istvan Hont has ably written. “Jealousy of trade,” he explains, 
“was often a response to the neo-Machiavellian imperialism of free trade. It aimed 
at regaining political autonomy from market pressures, if not by military means, 
then by abandoning markets or by rigging them.”78 With the French colonial trade 
suppressed, Britain dominated global commerce; and now that France was opening 
her colonial trade to neutral merchants, what was to stop neutral powers from 
joining the fray in order to guard their newfound trading rights? 
Britain responded in two ways. First, it abandoned the Grotian view of neutrality, 
a view in which neutral rights expand and contract in accordance with the justice 
of the war, on the ground that it posed no less a threat to that delicate balance of 
global power than did the commercial designs of the neutral Dutch and Danes. The 
British adopted a view of neutrality akin to Bynkershoek’s, one in which,
It is the Duty […] of those who are not concerned in the Dispute, to be extremely 
attentive to their Conduct, that they may not thereby contribute to render the Contest 
unequal: As far as Man is concerned, it is Force alone, on which the Decision depends; 
to add therefore by any means to the Power of one Party, is, manifest Injustice to the 
Other, and besides is highly injurious to the rest of Mankind; since it necessarily tends 
to spread Discord among Nations, and from a single Spark of Contention so light up a 
general Flame.79
Second, Britain sought a juridically sound enforcement of the Treaty of 1674. On its 
face, the treaty supported the new trade in which the Dutch were engaged under 
the doctrine of free ships, free goods. But viewed through the prism of traditional 
rules of treaty construction, free ships, free goods was not compatible with the 
circumstances of the Seven Years’ War. To allow a neutral to take advantage of 
the privileged position afforded to him under treaty law under circumstances not 
contemplated at the time the treaty was concluded would be a breach of good faith. 
And for the Dutch to prize economic advantage over good faith was to succumb to 
Machiavellianism of the worst order. 
The anti-Machiavellian tone of the reaction could not have been clearer than 
when Jenkinson wrote,
Those scandalous Maxims of policy, which have brought Disgrace both on the Name and 
Profession [of statecraft], took their Rise from the Conduct of the little Principalities of 
Italy […] and their refined Shifts and Evasions formed into Systems by the Able Doctors’ 
of their Councils, have composed the Science, which the World hath called Politics, a 
Science of Fraud and Deceit […] as if there could be no Morality among Nations, and 
78 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 62.
79 Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government, p. 3. Both Jenkinson and Marriott cited 
Bynkershoek heavily in their pamphlets. The advantage of using the arguments of a distinguished 
Dutch jurist to challenge Dutch claims could not have been lost on either the authors or their 
audience. 
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that Mankind, being formed into Civil Societies, and collectively considered, were set 
free from all Rules of Honour and Virtue.80
To disregard good faith in public agreements by assuming the character of the 
enemy was to travel the slippery slope to Machiavellian politics. Marriott therefore 
urged as an antidote the application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, a principle 
of treaty construction holding that an agreement could be deemed invalid or subject 
to renegotiation if new circumstances arose thwarting its purpose and intent. He 
argued that “a Commercial Treaty […] extends no farther in its Obligation than to 
the general State of Commerce in existence, and view at the time of contracting 
[…]. What was not in being, nor probable to be foreseen, could not be in the View 
of the contracting Parties.” Because the French West Indies had not been open to 
the Dutch at the time the Treaty of 1674 was concluded, it could not be permitted 
now, least of all to the prejudice of England.81 
The self-serving nature of this argument could not be clearer. The Dutch might 
just as easily have replied that for the British to prize their own economic advantage 
over their obligation to abide by their treaty obligations was no less Machiavellian. 
Only two decades before the Seven Years’ War Bynkershoek dismissed the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as a juridically obsolete example of the worst sort of 
Machiavellian politics. He explained that under the doctrine, 
compacts can be broken: (1) if a new condition has arisen suitable for reopening 
discussion; (2) if circumstances have come to such a pass that one cannot take action; 
(3) if the reasons that promoted the alliance have ceased to exist; (4) if the needs of the 
state or expedience demand a different course. […] [Y]ou would hardly save yourself 
from Machiavellianism, if you would slink off to these dens of treachery with the itching 
soul of a prince. […] Particularly that last exception which permits the breach of oath 
in case of the state’s needs and advantages, what else is it but the thing they call ratio 
status, a monster of many heads which almost no prince resists? And what are the 
three former exceptions but cloaks of treachery?82
The arguments adduced by Bynkershoek and Jenkinson on this matter reveal the 
underlying tension between trade and defense during commercial war. For the 
Dutch, undertaking the carrying trade to the French West Indies was a means of 
preserving the wealth and security of their state. For the English, the destruction 
of that commerce was likewise a means of preserving the wealth and security of 
their state. In both cases, commerce was a reason of state of utmost importance 
to national survival in time of war. The only question was, whose national survival 
had priority?
80 Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government, p. 24.
81 Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships Considered, p. 11.
82 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, p. 190.
Trade and War : The Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-State System
37
It is not surprising that Bynkershoek’s discussion of rebus sic stantibus 
was conspicuously absent from Richard Lee’s treatise, which turned instead to 
Bynkershoek’s reasoned assault on free ships, free goods. Bynkershoek wrote that 
whatever the literal content of international agreements, 
we must rather consider the dictates of reason than the phraseology of treaties. And in 
consulting reason, I cannot see why it should not be lawful to seize enemy goods found 
in neutral ships, for this is only taking what belongs to the enemy and falls to the victor 
by the laws of war. You may perhaps argue that it is impossible to seize enemy goods 
in a neutral ship without first seizing the ship, and that this act would involve a deed of 
violence against a neutral which would be as unlawful as attacking our enemies in a 
neutral port or carrying on depredations in neutral territory. In answer, I would remind 
you that it is entirely lawful to detain a neutral vessel in order to determine not only 
from her flag, which might be deceptive, but also from the documents found on board 
whether she really is neutral.83 
This was ultimately the line of reasoning that the British prize courts would employ 
in dealing with the captures of the Seven Years’ War. But that, as discussed in the 
following section, would require a total reformulation of the traditional meaning of 
neutrality. 
Translating Theory into Practice
The polemical literature cited in this paper did more than introduce the British 
public to the writings of Bynkershoek. The authors’ purpose, as Marriott put it, was 
to publicize principles of neutrality affirmed by “Writers […] of every country, and of 
the highest Authority, and by the common Usage of all Nations.”84 Their audience 
was Dutch as well as British, and two of the publications were translated into Dutch 
and circulated in Holland.85 Just as the pamphlets introduced a British audience 
83 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, vol. 2, pp. 88–9. Cf. Lee, Treatise of Captures in War, 
Chapter 11.
84 Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships Considered, p. 2.
85 The British State Papers for Holland show that British officials were acutely aware that despite 
their formal negotiations with members of the State General, they were really contending with 
what Yorke described as “a whole Country of Merchants and Advocates.” SP 84/482, Yorke to 
Holdernesse, 29 December 1758. For Britain to gain any traction with them, she would have to appeal 
directly to aggrieved parties on the basis of reason and fairness. In 1759, as Anglo-Dutch relations 
approached a breaking point, Joseph Yorke wrote to the Secretary of State: “in order to open the 
Eyes of the Publick, as much as possible upon this Subject, I have had translated and published the 
best Pamphlets which have been written and published in England upon the King’s right to annul the 
Treaty of 1674.” SP 84/482, Yorke to Holderness, 2 January 1759. Although Yorke did not specify 
the pamphlets, James Marriott’s The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered and Charles Jenkinson’s 
Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great-Britain in respect to Neutral Nations, During 
the Present War are likely. These were the only English pamphlets published on the Anglo-Dutch 
trade dispute in time for Yorke to commission his translations. Numerous printings evidence their 
popularity. Marriott’s pamphlet was first published in 1758 and was republished three times over 
the course of the following year. It was published once again in 1778, the year that Marriott was 
appointed judge of the High Court of Admiralty. Jenkinson, later Lord Liverpool, first published his 
pamphlet in 1758. It was republished twice in 1759 and again in 1794 and 1801. Both pamphlets 
endorsed the views of Cornelius Bynkershoek on the duties of neutrals in wartime.
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to the writings of Bynkershoek, they also introduced a Dutch audience to the 
legal principles underlying British prize proceedings. For example, Lee’s treatise 
includes a chapter titled “Of the Method of Trying Prizes taken in War,” which 
directly addressed the procedural issues that so angered and confounded Dutch 
traders. The chapter explained the British system of prize appeals, emphasising 
the fairness and justice of the proceedings. Cases tried in the prize courts, Lee 
assured, would be decided “by the Maritime Law of all Nations, universally and 
immemorially received,”86 He also recycled the oft-pressed argument that British 
prize courts were “not less the courts of the Captured, than of the Captor.”87 
These writers continued an enterprise begun earlier in the High Court of 
Admiralty during the War of the Austrian Succession. In case after case during that 
conflict, the High Court of Admiralty released neutral ships found to be trading for 
the enemy, using Bynkershoek’s words as an admonition of sorts. In the Postillion 
of Bordeaux (1744), for example, the Court warned that neutrals who commit 
unneutral acts become in effect belligerents. “If a friend lets out his ship upon an 
illicit Trade,” the court declared, “he shall be treated as an enemy.”88 However, the 
Court was not yet ready to translate theory into practice. Not until the Seven Years’ 
War would the time and circumstances be ripe for that. By then, Britain would have 
the naval might and political will to effect the doctrinal transformation that redefined 
the rights of neutrals in the centuries that followed. From the early days of the 
Seven Years’ War, lawyers tested the resolve of the prize courts with respect to the 
neutral carrying trade of enemy goods. An advocate representing a certain James 
Colladon asked the King’s Advocate George Hay for his opinion as to whether “any 
persons besides the subjects of France [could] trade to Martinico without its being 
deemed a contraband trade” and whether his Genevan client might trade there. 
On 18 September 1756, Hay replied in no uncertain terms that no one but French 
subjects might trade with Martinique.89 The first condemnation of a Dutch ship 
during the Seven Years’ War put teeth into the admonitions issued in the Postillion 
and by Hay. The America, a Dutch-flagged ship, delivered a French-owned cargo 
to the French Island of Santo Domingo, where it took on a cargo of colonial goods. 
Upon being stopped by a British privateer, the ship’s master started jettisoning the 
ship’s papers, destroying some of the bills of lading. The privateer captured the 
ship and brought it to harbour where it was condemned. The privateer was able to 
prove that the voyage was chartered by French merchants to trade with a French 
colony under French papers, and was therefore no longer bona fide Dutch. Upon 
appeal to the Lords Commissioners, the tribunal condemned both the ship and its 
86 Lee, Treatise of Captures in War, p. 147.
87 Marriott, Case of the Dutch Ships Considered, p. 36.
88 High Court of Admiralty, 30/875. London. Public Records Office. The record of the case further 
notes, “All neutrals who does an act inconsistent with neutrality acts as an Enemyies […] Brukerstock 
[sic].”
89 HCA 30/875, George Hay, King’s Advocate, to Unknown Recipient, 18 Sept. 1756. 
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cargo as lawful prize on the ground that both were presumptively French, having 
assumed the nationality of the enemy by carrying his trade for him. The decision 
established what came to be known as the Rule of the War of 1756: that no neutral 
may undertake in wartime a trade closed to him in time of peace.90
What condemned the America along with her cargo was not just her participation 
in the French carrying trade, but the fact that she was caught with French papers. 
The question of how to deal with Dutch ships carrying French colonial goods under 
Dutch papers was more complicated. The practice of transhipping enabled neutrals 
to avoid acknowledging intermediate stops made in French colonies while trading 
between the Dutch West Indies and the Continent. The only bills of lading a Dutch 
captain might keep as proof of his voyage were those issued in Dutch colonies. 
Thus the cargo’s paper trail was apparently neutral in character. The first case that 
the Prize Commissioners decided on this point was not Dutch, but Spanish. The 
Jesus Maria Joseph took on a cargo from a French ship that sailed into Coruña, a 
Spanish port. The Jesus Maria Joseph was captured en route to San Sebastian, 
whence it was to sail to France. The ship was taken to a British port and its cargo 
was condemned as prize. On appeal, the Lords Commissioners upheld the 
condemnation of the cargo on the ground that the entire voyage “from the French 
Island to Corunna, from Corunna to San Sebastian, and thence to a port of Old 
France” constituted a single transportation of enemy goods aboard a neutral ship. 
Lord Hardwicke commented that notwithstanding the rights the Spanish enjoyed 
as neutrals under a treaty of 1667,91 the purpose of that treaty and others like it was 
“to leave the neutral with the same advantages, no better and no worse off in war 
than in peace.”92 
In this way the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage and the Rule of the War of 1756 
resolved a question posed earlier: whose right to self-preservation takes priority 
in a commercial war? The neutral state, whose wealth and power stand to benefit 
from participation in newly opened trades? Or the belligerent, whose very survival 
depends on its ability to destroy enemy commerce? The prize courts ruled on the 
side of the belligerent by formulating doctrines that effectively froze in time the 
rights of neutrals to their pre-war status. The crisis of neutrality during the Seven 
Years’ War made it painfully clear that global commercial markets tended towards 
freedom, regardless of the belligerents’ political and military imperatives. The 
more successful Britain was in crushing French commerce, the more opportunities 
France opened for neutrals to profit. By adopting Byknershoek’s morally sparse 
conception of neutrality and projecting it abroad through naval dominance, Britain 
90 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, pp. 197–8, 201–2. See also, O. H. Mootham, “The 
Doctrine of Continuous Voyage”, British Yearbook of International Law 8 (1927), pp. 63–67. 
91 The Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1667 upheld the principle that unfree ships make unfree goods, but 
was silent on whether Spain enjoyed the rights of free ships, free goods. Pares, Colonial Blockade 
and Neutral Rights, pp. 175–6.
92 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, p. 220. 
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saw to it that the neutral would not be allowed to profit at the expense of belligerents 
in time of war. 
Conclusion 
The Seven Years’ War forced Britain to confront a fundamental question: whether 
neutral ships carrying on the enemy’s trade could be characterized as truly neutral. 
The resulting Rule of the War of 1756 and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage 
had the collective effect of codifying into law Bynkershoek’s view that the proper 
function of the neutral is not to sit in judgment of the justice of the belligerents’ 
claims, but to be a true medius favouring neither side. Under the Rule of the War 
of 1756, the neutral could not undertake in wartime commercial activities from 
which he had been barred in time of peace. Under the Doctrine of Continuous 
Voyage, the neutral could not use his flag and ports to carry on the enemy’s trade. 
Either act would tip the scales at whose centre neutral status was precariously 
balanced. Britain’s prize courts were uniquely suited to deal with the practical 
problems posed by the global commercial warfare of the Seven Years’ War. The 
war was commercial not only in the sense that the parties sought to open up new 
markets for domestic manufactures and trade, but insofar as enemy commerce 
was perceived as a weapon of war that had to be stopped. Trade ceased to be an 
inherently neutral activity in time of war since its ultimate purpose was to strengthen 
the side that profited; if that side happened to be the enemy, trading on his behalf 
was tantamount to an act of war. The Seven Years’ War thus represents a turning 
point of the historical development of neutral rights. 
The Rule of the War of 1756 itself had historical precedents. Reginald Marsden 
has identified at least two earlier occasions on which admiralties applied the 
principle that a neutral may not undertake in time of war commercial activities 
from which he was excluded in time of peace. In a 1604 case the Dutch admiralty 
condemned two Spanish-flagged Venetian vessels carrying cargo from Spanish 
America to Spain, and in 1630 the English admiralty condemned neutral ships 
carrying on Spanish coastal trade.93 Why then, once established, did the principle 
not endure as it did in the wake of the Seven Years’ War? Again, the answer lies not 
in the courtroom but at sea. The Seven Years’ War, unlike other wars before it, left 
Britain with the most powerful navy in the world and with an Admiralty determined 
to assert its rights aggressively, which it did in every war thereafter. The United 
States adopted the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage during the American Civil War, 
when British-flagged ships began running blockades on Confederate ports, and 
France followed suit during the Crimean War. Likewise, Japan adopted the rule 
during the Sino-Japanese War, and Italy adopted it during the Abyssinian War of 
the late nineteenth century. During the Seven Years’ War Britain in effect set the 
93 Reginald Marsden, “Early Prize Jurisdiction and Prize Law in England, Part II”, English Historical 
Review 98 (1910), pp. 244–45.
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agenda for the debate on neutral rights in the coming century. When confronted 
with neutral trade inconsistent with its own war goals, every maritime power would 
adopt a similar stance.
